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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the State of Utah
STEVEN M. ESERNIA,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vsOVERLAND MOVING COMPANY,
a corporation, and THOMAS C.
JONES,

Case No.

7195

Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLAN·T'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACT
(All italics, unless otherwise noted, are appellant's)
On June 24, 1943, Steven M. Esernia, age 26 (Tr.
79) and Paul Meredith were in the town of Elko, Nevada.
At the· time both men were in the United States Marine
Corps. At about ten o'clock in the evening (Tr. 80), a
truck of the defendant Overland Moving Company,
loaded with furniture and household goods (Tr. 152)
and being driven by the defendant Thomas C. Jones,
pulled alongside a small hamburger stand in the eastern
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outskirts of Elko, where the plaintiff and Meredith were
standing. The driver asked them if they were going to
Salt Lake and if they wanted a ride (Tr. 81). The
offer was accepted, and the two men entered the moving
van as guests (admitted by answer Tr. 25). Esernia
was sitting on the right side of the van cab and Meredith
in the middle between the driver and Esernia (Tr. 82).
The driver was alone at the time the trip from Elko
commenced and prior to the time Esernia and Meredith
entered the cab (Tr. 82).
At the time Esernia entered the van, the driver
stated that he was tired and weary and wanted someone
to talk to and also wanted company (Tr. 122). Esernia
later testified (Tr. 122) that the driver stated he wanted
company so he wouldn't fall asleep, although the evidence is not entirely clear as to whether the driver made
this statement at the time of or pTior to Esernia 's entering the van or shortly after the journey had started.
About an hour out of Elko, the driver stated that he
did not mind either Esernia or Meredith dozing, but
that he wanted one of them to keep busy so he would
stay awake (Tr. 82). About an hour after the trip
started, or possibly four hours (Tr. 124), Esernia dozed·
a little and woke up to find the truck bouncing along
the shoulder of the road, the country adjacent to the
road being wilderness and flat (Tr. 84). It was, of
course, dark at that time. The driver pulled the truck
back onto the highway and stated that he had dozed
off (Tr. 86). The driver mentioned a few times that
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he '\Yas sleepy and stated that he did not want both of
the guests to sleep as it '\Yould make him sleepy (Tr.
123, 124). During the entire trip, neither Esernia nor
Meredith got out of the cab, and Esernia did not recall
that the driver stopped, other than at a stop sign (Tr.
125, 126).
The driver stated that he had stopped at Wendover
and Delle, Utah, on the trip, and that at the latter place
both guests were asleep at the time of the stop ( Tr. 156).
At about six o'clock in the morning of June 25, the
truck was travelling toward the scene of the accident
near the junction of U. S. highway 40 and 50, which
is approximately one mile in an easterly direction from
the Lake Point Service Station and somewhat over a
mile west of Black Rock Beach in Utah (Tr. 59). The
road at the scene of the accident ran in a northerly
direction, curving slightly to the east (Tr. 61). (See
also Exhibit "A" prepared by State Highway Patrolman Frank Eastman, Tr. 60.) At the northerly
side of the curve were a series of six guard rails, the
center of which were five feet six inches ( Tr. 64) from
the northerly edge of the paved portion of the highway,
and to the north of these guard rails was a culvert some
thirteen feet northerly from said edge (Tr. 64). The
truck failed to make the curve and crossed from the
southerly side of the highway across and onto the gravel
on the northerly side of the highway, and passed betwee~
the culvert and the guard rails ( Tr. 65) some distance
to the north and east .where the truck ultimately tipped
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over on its side. Two of the guard rails, 6" x 6", were
damaged by the truck's passage (Tr. 70). The distance
from the point where the truck left the north edge of
the hard surface of the highway to the culvert was 264
feet (Tr. 65), and from that point to the point where
the truck came to rest was approximately 386 feet.
There is some conflict in the testimony relative to this
latter distance (Tr. 72). The road at the scene of the
accident was more or less level (Tr. 74) with a slight
upgrade (Tr. 75) and of standard two-lane width.
As a result of the departure of the truck from the
road and the fact that it tipped over on its side, the
plaintiff Esernia received very substantial and permanent injuries, necessitating extensive periods of hospitalization (Tr. 91 to 118).
The first thing of the accident that the driver recalled was the front wheel of the truck hitting the gravel
on the side of the road ( Tr. 156), passing between the
guard rails and the culvert, striking the last two guard
rails, and tipping over on its side. The reason the truck
left the highway was, as the driver stated, ''I must
have dozed, or something'' ( Tr. 188; see also Exhibit
'' B ''), and he assumed that the accident was caused
by his going to sleep ( Tr. 189). The driver did not
agree with Patrolman Eastman as to the distance the
truck traveled on the gravel from the hard surfaced
portion of the highway to the guard rail, his estimate
being about 40 or 60 feet (Tr. 190). Dilworth S. Wooley,
vice-president and general manager of the company,
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stated that drivers "\Yere instructed not to take riders in
the truck ( Tr. 200).
At the conclusion of the testimony of plaintiff, a
motion to dismiss as to both defendants "Tas denied by
the court (Tr. 148). Thereafter, and at the conclusion
of the testimony of both plaintiff and defendant, the
court granted a directed verdict in favor of both the
defendant Thomas C. Jones and the defendant Overland :Jfoving Company (Tr. 202, 203).

STATEMENT OF ERROR
Appellant and plaintiff relies upon the following
errors:

Error Number 1
The trial court erred in granting the motion of
defendant Thomas C. Jones for a directed verdict (Tr.
37, 202).

Error Number 2
The trial court erred in granting the motion of
defendant Overland Moving Company for a directed
verdict (Tr. 37, 203).

ARGUMENT
Since the motion for a directed verdict as to each
defendant involves substantially the same considerations, for purpos·es of this brief they will be treated
together. An adequate consideration of the action of
the trial court in granting the motions resolves itself
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into several categories. The motions were made not
only upon the ground that there was a failure of the
plain tiff to prove the willful misconduct of the defendants, but also that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence and that he assumed the risk. As to
the defendant Overland Moving Company, there is also
the additional ground alleged in its motion that the
driver and employee had no authority to carry guest
pass·engers in the van. Since the court did not indicate
the ground upon which the motions were granted, other
than as reflected in the motions themselves, it becomes
necessary to consider the several grounds of the motions.

A. Action on the part of the defendants amounting
to willful miscondu·ct.
It is believed that there can he no dispute that there
was adequate evidence from which the jury could have
found that the driver of the van dozed and went to
sleep at the wheel, with the result that the van continued
on across a curve in the highway to the opposite side
of the road and turned over, injuring plaintiff. Actually,
the evidence on this point is so clear and convincing,
that no other conclusion could possibly have been
reached. It also seems equally clear that the driver
had a premonition of his physical condition and a knowl·edge that he was sleepy and tired. It will be noted that
at th'e time plaintiff and his traveling companion were
picked up in Elko, Nevada, there is some testi1nony
that the driver initially stated he was sleepy and wanted
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company on the trip to keep awake, although there
is also testimony indicating that at this particular time
he merely stated that he was tired and wanted company.
The testimony is not entirely clear on this matter, there
being positive statements as to both versions in the
testimony of plaintiff. At any rate, some time after
departing from Elko and while en route to Salt Lake
City, the truck left the har·d surface portion of the
highway and traveled for some distance on the shoulder
when the driver momentarily dozed, although nothing
happened as a result of his action and the van was
ultimately pulled back upon the highway. Also there
is an abundance of testimony that at numerous times
during the trip, the driver stated that he was tired and
sleepy, and that he was aware of his physical condition
which was one dangerous to the adequate driving and
control of the van. We believe that the evidence relative
to the cause of th'e accident and premonition of physical
condition is so clear that additional reference to the
transcript beyond that set forth in the statement of
facts is unnecessary.
By virtue ·of the requirements of the Utah "guest"
statute, 57-11-7 U.C.A. 1943, an action by a guest against
the driver of a vehicle must be grounded either upon
intoxication or willful misconduct. Since there is no
elem'ent of intoxication in this case, the complaint was
predicated upon the actions noted above as being willful
misconduct. we believe that the applicable law clearly
establishP,s that a driver who goes to sleep at the wheel
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

of a moving vehicle with the result that it leaves the
highway .and turns over, with premonition of his :sleepy
condition" is guilty of ''willful misconduct'' under a
guest statute such as was in effect in Utah at the time
of the arciden t here involved.
The physical attributes of a sleepy condition and
their eff~ct on driving ability have been frequently
considered in cases of this kind. One of the most quoted
decisions is that of Bushnell vs. Bushnell, 131 Atl. 432
(Conn. 1925), and the language of that decision is particularly applicable here, even though the problem of
negligence was not .that of willful misconduct. At page
435, the court stated:
''Sleep in such a situation does not ordinarily
come upon one unawares, and, by watching for
indications of its approach or heeding circumstances which are likely to bring it about, one
may either ward it off or ceas~ an activity
capable of danger to himself or to others. There
are few ordinary agencies so fraught with danger
to life and property as an automobile proceeding
upon the highway freed of the direction of a
conscious mind, and, because this .is so, reasonable
care to avoid such a danger requires a very
. great care.''
In Steele v-s. Lackey, 177 Atl. 309 (Vt. 1935) defendant was driving plaintiff home from a dance when,
without previous indication of sleepy condition, he dozed
at the wheel while rounding a slight curve. The car left
the highway and in the resulting accident plaintiff was
injured. Th'e action was brought under a Vermont guest
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statute requiring gross neg~ligence, "chich the court
viewed as a degree of fault between ordinary negligence
and reckless or wanton misconduct. Judgment for plaintiff "\Yas affirmed. The court stated at page 312:
''It is said that sleep does not ordinarily arrive "\Yithout "\Yarning or premonitory symptoms.
Bushnell Y. Bushnell, supra, page 435 of 131 A;
Go,ver v. Strain, supra; Devlin v. Morse, supra.
Normally it did not come unheralded to the defendant, as he admitted. There was sufficient
evidence to enable the jury, acting reasonably, to
find that he knevv, or ought to have known, that
it vvas likely that sleep would come, and that, in
these circumstances, his operation of the car was
conduct indicating an indifference to the duty
O"\Yed to the plaintiff as his guest, or an utter
forgetfulness of her safety.''
In Marks vs. Marks, 31 N. E. 2d 399 (Ill. 1941),
plaintiff guest and defendant driver were proceeding
from D·etroit to Chicago. They left Detroit about 5 or
5:30 p. m. and about 9 :30 p. m. plaintiff suggested they
stop for night but defendant was anxious to continue on
into Chicago for business reasons, 'vhich they did. Plaintiff himself participated in driving a portion of the
way, and actually was driving the car when they entered
Chicago at 5 :00 a. m. wh·ere they ran out of gas. While
obtaining gasoline, one of the men stated he was tired
and sleepy, and they were admonished by the attendant
at the gas station that they had better watch their step.
Shortly after leaving the gas station defendant fell
asleep, and plaintiff himself was also asleep, when the
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accident occurred. Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed.
The Illinois statute required and the complaint
charged the defendant, second count, with wanton, willful, and malicious misconduct. This the defendant denied, hut he also stated that if such conduct constituted
such willful and wanton misconduct, the plaintiff was
equally guilty of the same misconduct.
The case contains a review of many Illinois decisions, and also emphasizes that ill will is not an element
of wilful misconduct. Thus at page 401:
''In Bernier v. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co., 296
Ill. 464, 129 N. E. 747, 749, the court said: 'Ill
will is not a necessary element of a wanton act.
To constitute a wanton act, the party doing the
act or failing to act must he conscious of his conduct, and, though having no intent to injure,
must he conscious, from his knowledge of surrounding circumstances and existing conditions,
that his conduct will naturally or probably result
in injury. * * * It is difficult, if not impossible,
to lay down a rule of general application by
which we may determine what degree of negli. gence the law considers equivalent to a \villful or
wanton act. Whether an act is willful or wanton
is greatly dependent upon the particular circumstances of each case. Where the omission to
exercise care is so gross that it shows a lack of
regard for the safety of others, it will justify
the presumption of willfulness or wantonness.' ''
Again at page 402 :
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"In the instant case, the evidence shows that
the plaintiff and defendant were sleepy and tired.
Defendant admits that to be true as does the
plaintiff. The attendant at the gasoline station
also testified that the t\YO men appeared to be
very tired and sleepy and he \Yarned then1 to be
careful. Defendant knevv that he was sleepy and
\Yas apt to fall asleep \Yhile driving, yet he took
control of the automobile and drove until he
actually fell asleep which resulte-d in the accident
whereby plaintiff was injured.
''In Barmann v. McConachie, 289 TIL App.
196, at page 202, 6 N. E. 918, 921, the court continuing in its opinion said:
,.Defendant seriously contends that defendant's failure to judge correctly of his ability to
resist sleep was an error of judgment and that
it will not support a finding of willful and wanton
negligence. D·efendant's act did not arise from
an error of judgment. It came about by reason
of his failure to exercise judgment. He permitted
himself to go to sleep while driving, and an act
of omission may be made the basis of willful and
wanton negligence, the same as an act of commiSSion.
'The finding of the jury that the defendant
was guilty of willful and wanton negligence is
supported by the law and evidence.~ ''
In the case of Barmann vs. McConachie, 6 N. E. 2d
918 (lll. 1937), plaintiff sued for personal injuries allegedly the result of defendant's willful and wanton
negligence in the operation of his automobile at a time
when plaintiff was riding with him as his guest The
evidence showed that the defendant driver, when two
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or three miles from his destination, knew the guest was
asleep, appreciated that an accident might happen if he
also w·ent to sleep and that he was sle~epy. He continued
to drive, however, and the automobile crashed into a
telephone pole. Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed upon appeal.
See also Secrist v. Raffleson, 62 N. E. 2d 36 (Ill.

1945).
In Potz vs. Williams, 155 Atl. 211 (Conn. 1931) defendant driver was proceeding at a moderate rate of
speed on the proper side of a rather wide street when
his car suddenly swerved across the street and collided
with an oncoming car. He had been driving .all day
before the accident, was tired and yawning, and had
apparently momentarily dozed a short time before the
actual collision. Judgment for guest plaintiff was affirmed. The applicable law was stated by the court at·
page 212 as follows:·
''As a guest in the car the plaintiff could only
recover if she satisfied the jury that the defendant was guilty of reckless conduct within the
provisions of section 1628 of the General Statutes. This statute, in the aspect of it here presented, requires proof by a guest in an automobile seeking to recover from the operator of it
that the accident was '' 'caused by his heedless
and his reckless disregard of the rights of
others,' and, in substance, that it constituted
wanton misconduct which consisted of a reckless
disregard of the just rights or safety of others
in their lives, limbs, health, reputation, or propSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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erty, or of the consequences of one's action.''
Grant v. :JiacLelland, 109 Conn. 517, 5~0, 147 A.
138, 139. In Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583,
page 592, 131 _._-\. 43:2, 435, 44 A. L. R. 785, in
considering sleep in its relation to negligence, we
said: ''In anv ordinarY case, one cannot go to
sleep \vhile driving an. ~utomobile \Yithout haYing
relaxed the vigilance \Yhich the la\v requires,
\Yithout having been negligent. It lies vvithin his
own control to keep a"rake or cease from driving.
And so the mere fact of his going to sleep while
driving is a proper basis for an inference of
negligence sufficient to make out a prima facie
case, and sufficient for a recovery, if no circumstances tending to excuse or justify his conduct
are proven." \\T e also there pointed out (page
591 of 103 Conn., 131 A. 432, 435) : ''There are
fe\v ordinary agencies so fraught with danger
to life and property as an automobile proceeding
upon the highway freed from the direction of a
conscious mind, and, because this is so, reasonable
care to avoid such a danger requires very great
care." It is but the plainest common sense· fo
recognize that there are circumstances under
which the operation of an automobile upon the
highway by one who is or should be aware of the
likelihood that sleep will overtake him could
reasonably be held to constitute reckless misconduct. Blood v. Adams (Mass.) 169 N. E. 412.
Whether in a particular case this is so must depend upon the circumstances, and especially upon
the extent to which the driver realizes or ought
to realize that there is a likelihood of sleep overtaking him. Ordinarily the decision of the question must be one of fact for the jury, and, if the
conclusion they reach is reasonable in the light
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of the evidence and the inferences they may properly draw, it must stand."
In Erickson v. V ogt, 80 P. 2d 533 (Calif. 1938) the
plaintiff guest and defendant driver were returning to
San Diego somewhat after midnight, when the driver
dozed to such an extent that the automobile grazed the
curh. Sometime later he dozed again and the car struck
a pole, injuring plain tiff. The case was predicated upon
willful misconduct and intoxication, as to which later
element there was.also some ·evidence. Judgment on an
instructed verdict for defendant was revers·ed, the court
holding that it was a jury question on the issues.
The court stated at page 535:
''As was again said in Wright v. Sellers, 79
P. 2d 209, page 215, with respect to the matter of
proof:
'It is sufficient if the act, or the failure to
act, be done or omitted under such circumstances
as would justify the reasonable inference that the
driver should have known that injury to his guest
vvas a probable result, for again, positive evidentiary proof of such knowledge would be an imp·ossibility in most cases.'
In the circumstances we think that the question whether respondent was or was not guilty
of willful misconduct was in the instant case one
of fact for the jury, rather than. of la-\v for the
court.''
In Hardgrove v:s. Bade, 252 N. W. 334 (Minn. 1934)
plaintiff guest and defendant driver were on a trip from
Minneapolis to Bismarck, N. D. Whil·e on a detour, deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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fendant fell asleep and plunged the automobile into a
ditch injuring the plaintiff. Three times during the trip
the plaintiff had requested the defendant to let her
drive if tired and sleepy, but defendant assured her
he 'vas all right and ·needed no assistance. Defendant
had stated he was tired and sleepy several times prior
to the accident. At the time the car left the highway,
the plaintiff had closed her eyes, but was not certain
whether she was actually asleep or not. The court ap·plied the law of North Dakota and its guest statute
granting a cause of action for intoxication, willful misconduct or gross negligence and held the cas'e presented
a jury question as to defendant's liability. Judgment
for plaintiff was affirmed.
In Masters vs. Cardi, 42 S. E. 2d 203 (Va. 1947),
the court stated at page 206:
''Gross negligence has been defined in many
of our opinions and we need not define it again.
Each case must depend upon its own peculiar
facts, and we generally leave the determination
of the question to the jury. It is their province
to consider all of the evidence including the circumstances and surroundings of each case and
then ascertain whether the acts and conduct of
the host amount to gross negligence.''
See also Curtis vs. ~Curtis, 70 P. 2d 369 (Ida. 1937);
Salvas vs. Cantin, 160 Atl. 727 (N. H. 1932) ; ~CorV'alho

v·s. Oliveria, 25 N. E. 2d 764 (Mass. 1940); Tennes v·s.
Tennes, 50 N. E. 2d 132 (Ill. 1943); Hoffa·rt vs. Southern
Pacific Co., 92 P. 2d 436 (Cal. 1939); McMillan vs. Sims,
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112 S. W. 2d 793 (Tex. 1939); Manse.r VB. Eder, 248 N.
W. 563 (Mich. 1933); Freedman vs. Hurwitz, 164 Atl.
647 (Conn. 1933).
Appellant is fully cognizant of the fact that a few
of the above citations deal with an issue of gross negligence as contrasted to willful misconduct. The citations
have be'en incorporated herein, however, because the
definitions of gross negligence seem to ·embody the main
essentials of willful misconduct as defined in cases from
jurisdictions whose statute is of the latter type. For
exampl'e in Smith vs. Williams, 178 P. 2d 710 (Ore.
1947), the court stated at page 717:
''We hold that evidence that respondent drove
a bantam automobile over a road which was surfaced with loose rock and gravel at a speed upward of 50 miles per hour at 4 :00 in the morning
while he was sleepy and notwithstanding this
knowledge continued to drive and did go to sleep
thereby permitting the car to leave the road a.nd
turn over, is sufficient to take this case to the
jury on the issue of gross negligence. We hold
this constitutes evidence of conduct which indicates an indifference to the probable consequences of the act, a reckless disregard of the
rig·ht of others."
In addition, these cases on gross negligence clearly
point to the considerations involved ·in determining
whether or not there is a jury question in a given set
of facts involving dozing at the wheel of an automobile.
What is the net result of the application of the
rules of 1aw set forth above to the facts of the instant
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rase'? . A.. driver ·with fore,Yarning of sleep, even including an incident 'Yhere the van he was operating
left the highway as a result of dozing, later does go to
sleep and his van leaves the highway, turns over and
damages plaintiff. As the cases point out, sleep does
not come about instantly, and an experienced driver
who finds his faculties impaired and who must know
that to sleep at the wheel not only might but probably
will produce serious results, but notwithstanding continues the operation of the car, would certainly seem
to be guilty of willful misconduct. The extent of forewarning may not always be possible of accurate determination, but there is certainly in this case overwhelming evidence of such a forewarning. F·or a court to take
the position as a matter of law th'at willful misconduct
could not he adduced from the evidence of this case by
the jury is difficult to understand. In fact, the evidence seems so uncontroverted in this regard, that it
might be said that the willful misconduct was established as a matter of law.

B. Contributory negligence and assumption of risk.
Both contributory negligence and assumption of
risk are asserted in the motions for directed verdicts.
The distinction between the two seems clearly established in Utah, whatever 'the rule elsewhere, even though
reliance is made on th,e same set of facts.
In Kuchenmeister V'S. Los Angeles and 8. L. R. Co.,
52 Utah 116, 172 Pac. 725 ( 1918), the court stated, pages
728, 729:
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'' * * * The defenses of assumed risk and
contributory negligence are entirely independent,
and in case there is a conflict in the evidence, or
where the facts are such that reasonable men
may legitimately draw different conclusions from
the evidence, or may arrive at different conclusions, it cannot be determined as a matter of law
that either the one or the other defense is estab~
lished, and the jury may, therefore, find that one
of the defenses was established and may also find
that the other was not. While in some of. the
cases there is some confusion respecting the distinction between the two defenses, yet, as a gen·eral rule, the courts have found little difficulty
in enforcing the true distinction. The distinction
is, perhaps, as well and as clearly stated in a few
words as that can be done in the case of Thomas
v. Quartermaine, in L. R. 18, Q. B. Div. at page
697, where, in discussing the distinction, it is
said:
'But the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria
(assumed risk) stands outside the defense of
contributory negligence and is in no way limited
by it. In individual instances the two ideas
sometimes seem to cover the same ground, but
carelessness is not the sante thing as intelligent
choice.' (Italics ours.)
"The distinction is also very intelligently discussed and clearly stated by the author in 3
Labatt Mast. & Serv. Sec. 1219 et seq. The fundamental element in -assumption of risk, where
it is not assumed as a matter of contract, as stated
in the foregoing quotation, is 'intelligent choice';
that is, the employe, before he may he charged
with having assumed the risk, must not only have
fully understood and appreci~ted the danger, but
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he, in the very face of the danger, must, voluntarily, have assumed the risk of injury. Nothing
short of that constitutes intelligent choice. As a
matter of course, whether in any case the risk
,,·as or \Yas not assumed must be determined from
all the facts and circumstances. But whatever
those facts and circumstances are, it must appear
therefrom that the employe voluntarily elected
to continue in the hazardous work. It needs no
argument, therefore, to demonstrate that while
·in a particular case facts may be such as to justify a finding of both contributory negligence and
assumption of risk, yet contributory negligence
does not necessarily arise from intelligent choice,
and therefore is not necessarily included in
assumption of risk, as contended for by counsel.
''In view of what has just been said, it was
the province of the jury to say which one of the
two defenses was established.''
Contributory negligence is not a defense to actionable conduct involving \Yillfulness or wantonness, and
since this case does involve willful misconduct, it is difficult to see how such a defense in the usual sense of the
term can be asserted. Thus in Bordonaro vs. Senk, 147
Atl. 136 (Conn. 1929) the court stated, page 137 :
"Error is predicated upon the charge that
contributory negligence upon the plaintiff's part
would constitute no defense to an action based
upon the defendant's reckless disregard of the
rights of oth~rs. The defense of contributory
negligence is not available where injury is inflicted under· conditions open to the charge of
willfulness or wantonness.''
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The rule seems so well established as not to require
extensive citation. See Moreno vs. Los Angeles Transfer, 186· Pac. 800 (Calif. 1919) ; annotation: ''What
amounts to gross or wanton negligence in driving an
automobile precluding the defense of contributory negligence. '' 38 A. L. R. 1424 ; s. 72 A. L. R. 1357 ; s. 92
A. L. R. 1367 ; s. 119 A. L. R. 654.
It may be, however, that an act or failure to act
on the part of the defendant amounting in itself to willful misconduct, could become a defense, which for want
of a more accurate term could be called contributory
negligence. The importance lies in the fact that if such
a defense is available, the degree of culpability must be
equal. The cases cited above set forth the rules of law
to he -applied in determining willful misconduct and in
a broad sense would be equally applicable to any alleged
conduct of the plaintiff.
Assumption of risk and what might be termed contributory willful misconduct -have certain elements in
common, even though they may present distinct theories
of possible defense. Assumption of risk seems to have
originated in the contractual relationship of master and
servant, and is. still in many jurisdictions unavailable
as a theory of defense to .a tort action. In, those jurisdictions wherein the theory is permitted as a defense,
however, the basic assumption is that the plaintiff is
fully and completely aware of all of the haz!ards which
confront him, and notwithst~anding that knowledge elects
to continue his conduct or acquiesence in the actions of
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another. Before he can assumt> the risk, he n1ust first
fully know· and appreciate what that risk entails. Contributory "illful misconduct, if such there be, also requires that a complete and thorough knowledge of the
hazards confronting the plaintiff he known and fully
understood. The theory could only he, thereafter, that
not\vithstanding that knowledge and appreciation he
then fails to take the action indicated or continues a
course of action so clearly against his own interest as
to amount to willful misconduct.
In the instant case the action of the trial court in
granting a directed verdict means that as a matter of
la\v plaintiff fully appreciated the dangers confronting
him, assuming this was the ground upon which the
court's action \Yas predicated. As has been previously
indicated, sleep is a peculiar thing, and somewhat different from other physical conditions such as intoxication. The knowledge of the extent to which the condition affects the physical abilities is peculiarly within the
knowledge of the individual affected. True there may
be external indications, but there is always a serious
question ~as to just what they indicate. In this case, the
driver stated a number of times that he was tired and
sleepy, and he even on one oc.casion left the road momentarily before the accident. But how wa·s the plaintiff
to know that any such real danger continued to exist~
He was confronted by a man who was a professional
driver, engaged in van movements on a cross country
basis, and obviously experienced.

The driver might
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well have been tired and sleepy, but in view of the circumstances how can it be .said as a matter of law that
he was so tired and sleepy, that plaintiff fully appreciated the dangers confronting him~ The driver was
unknown to the plaintiff prior to the time he entered
the van, and there is nothing whatsoever to indicate
that he knew .anything of the mode of operation of the
van line, or of· the previous driving time of the driver.
That there actually was a danger, and real one, is ap,
parent from the fact that the driver went to sleep and
turned over the van. Only one man knew with certainty
the extent of the danger, and that was the driver himself. Can it be said as a matter of law, that the defendant
fully appreciated the hazards~
The contributory feature goes further, however,
since there must not only be the complete appreciation
of the danger, but also a failure to act. This leads to
the interesting inquiry of just what the plaintiff could
do ~as a practical matter. There is, incidently, nothing
in the record to show whether or not the plaintiff could
drive a car at all. Assume that he could, it is entirely
possible that the ordinary man would assume that a
request to drive a commercial van of large size would
he denied, and· there is also the question as to whether
or not an inexperienced individual would be capable of
driving such a vehicle. Was he as a matter of law required to keep up a running flow of conversation, under
the circumstances~ As a matter of law was i~t necessary
to step ·out of a van in the middle of the night in country
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which the plaintiff believed, and which could accurately
be described as, wilderness 1 Or to alight a't Wend over
or Wells again in the middle of the night1 In actuality,
was there anything to be gained by staying awake 1 In
this latter connection, the evidence is far from clear as
to ,,~hether or not plaintiff "\vas asleep or awake during
the period just prior to the accident, and for that
matter as to just how much of the trip he was asleep.
It seems clear that these are matters within the
province of the jury to decide, and it is difficult ·to see
how a trial court could resolve the problem as a. matter
of law. The cases clearly indicate that a jury question
is presented.
Thus in Freedman vs. Hurwitz, 164 Atlantic 647
(Conn. 1933), the court considered at length the doctrine of assumption of risk. The plaintiffs, age 15 and.
60, were riding as guests in the rear seat of defendant's
automobile. TheY: had joined defendant after he had
done considerable driving and was tired, and prior to
the accident and while driving, defendant and his wife
in the front seat of the automobile had stated that he
was tired and was afraid he might go to sleep and
that if he did, his wife "\vas to tickle him or pinch him.
The automobile swerved suddenly to the left side of
the highway and into an oncoming car some distance
after this conversation had taken place. The court held
that jury might have reasonably inferred that the cause
of the accident was due to the defendant's falling asleep
as he came opposite the other car. The defendant had
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interposed a special plea of assumption of risk in each
of the actions brought by the two plaintiffs. Judgment
for pl,aintiff in each case was affirmed. The defendant
on appeal contended the verdict should have been set
aside because the jury could not reach any conclusion
other than that the risk had been assumed and also
because, at the trial, the court had refused to submit
to the jury this defense. In discussing the doctrine, the
court stated ~at page ~649 :
''One is entitled to assume that another will
exercise proper care until he perceives, or ought
reasonably to perceive, that that other is not
doing so, and he does not assume the risk that
another will by some sudden negligent act or
omission subject him to danger. Stout v. Lewis,
11 La. App. 503, 123 So. 346. A pedestrian crossing a highway and injured by the negligent
operation of an automobile upon it, or the driver
of one car injured by collision with another, 1nay
be guilty of contributory negligence, but he does
not assume the risk of the sudden negligent act
or omission of the party who caused the collision.
1 Pollock, Torts, 173. So the mere fact that there
is a possibility known to the guest in an automobile that the driver may be guilty of a negligent
act or omission may not he a sufficient basis
upon which to hold that he has assumed the risk.
Marks v. Dorkin, supra, page 524 of 105 Conn.,
136 A. 83. And the doctrine can only apply where
the particular situation or condition producing
the risk has continued for such a length of time
that the party alleged to have assumed it can be
found to have known it or been charged with
knowledge of it, to have appreciated the risk to
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which he was subjected by it, either actually or
because he ought reasonably to have done so, and
to have had an opportunity to avoid it.
''It remains to apply these principles to the
case before us. The plaintiffs are a young girl
about fifteen years old at the time of the accident
and a woman then about sixty. They were riding
as guests of the defendant in the rear seat of his
automobile. It is true that the jury could have
reasonably found that each knew that the defendant was tired and sleepy and that he realized he
might fall asleep while driving the car, yet thereafter, without remonstrance or effort to guard
themselves from danger, they continued to ride
in it for a few minutes-just how long the record
does not disclose. As far as the denial of the
motion to set the verdict aside is concerned, it
must be remembered that the defense of assumption of risk is an affirmative one with the burden
of proof upon the defendant, and we cannot say
that the jury were bound to find as matter of law
that the plaintiffs appreciated the risk of the
defendant falling asleep. But beyond that, considering the ages and sex of these plaintiffs, their
position as guest of the defendant riding upon
the rear seat of the car, the hour of the night,
and the place where they were, with the other
surrounding circumstances, it does not appear
that there was any course which it could reasonably be said they ought to have adopted to avoid
such danger as there was in the situation. The
jury could n·ot reasonably have found that by continuing in the car they voluntarily chose to assume
the risk within the true meaning of the doctrine.
The trial court was correct in not submitting to
the jury the issue raised by the special pleas.''
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And in Erickson
page 536:

V'S.

Vogt, supra, the court stated at

"What we have here is a verdict for the defendant brought in under the courts instructions.
Upon an appeal from such a verdict appellant is
entitled to have every legitimate inference dra\vn
in her favor. While it is true that in the instant
case the parties had both ·been drinking during
the time they were at the dance hall, and had the
case been submitted to the jury it might have
found respondent to have been so far intoxicated
as to affect the safety of his driving, either by
making him drowsy ·or otherwise, still the evidence
does not indicate that his appearance was such as
necessarily to warn appellant o.f hi.s inability to
drive. So far as appears she may have had no
reasons for real apprehension, at least until he
fell into the doze and grazed the curb, and may
not, ev·en then, be chargeable with fully realizing
her danger or being in any position to have av'Oided it."
The court also quotes from the case of Lindemann
v. Sa;n Joaquin Cotton Oil Compa;ny, a,t page 536, as
follows:
"'There is no merit in the suggestion or eontention that the evidence which tended to estab;.
lish the intoxication of defendant Ewing to the
degree \vhich would render him liable for the
injuries and damages suffered by reason of the
accident is necessarily conclusive of the question
as to whether plaintiff had, or should have had,
knowledge that Ewing was so far affected by
intoxicating liquor as to defeat his claim for
damages. If that is trwe, then .every person riding
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single fact that the driver was not in a fit condition to drive the automobile . . . ' ''
And in Smith vs. Williams, supra, the court stated
at page 718:
''We hold that it is ~ question of fact as to
whether or not appellant was guilty of contributory negligence by reason of the fact. that he was
asleep at the time of the accident. Even if the
jury should find that this constituted negligence
upon the part of the appellant, still it is a· question of fact as to whether or not that negligence
proximately contributed to the happening of the
accident. 38 Am. Jur. 898, and cases cited in
notes 4 and 5. The question would still he : C·ould
he have done anything if awake~"
While the defendants pleaded the defense of assumption of risk the answer is silent ·as to any defense
of what might loosely be called contributory negligence.
Both are affirmative defenses, and assumption of risk
must be pleaded. See Slobodnjak vs. Coyne, 165 Atl. ·681
(Conn. 1933); Maurer vs. Fesing, 290 N. W. 191
(Wis. 1940). Because of the similarity between the
defenses, it seems entirely logical to assume that the
defense of willful misconduct must also he pleaded,
and that if it is not, no assertion of the defense can be
made. In this connection it is noted that willful misconduct is an entirely distinct matter from the ordinary
defense of contributory negligence.
Lastly, defendant Overland Moving Compnny assertS' that it cannot be held liable for the actions of its
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driver because h.e was specifically instructed not to pick
up riders, and his action in taking the plaintiff into the
truck as a p.as~senger and guest was in direct violation
of those instructions. This may well be true as to a
guest in an action predicated upon ordinary negligence.
In a case, however, involving willful misconduct, the
converse is true, an·d the defendant employer is liable.
An annotation, ''Liability of master for injury to
one whom servant, in violation of instructions, permits
to ride on vehicle," 12 A.L.R. 145, it is ·stated at page

147:
''On the other hand, one riding on a vehicle
by the permission of a servant, in violation of his
master's instructions, is not, according to the
weight of authority, deprived of all recourse
against the master f.or an injury sustained,
though the servant, in granting the permission,
is not acting within the scope of his employment,
or is not clothed by the master with the appan·nt
authority to grant it. In the case of such an
authorized permission to a third person to be on
the vehicle, it is generally held that, although~
the master is not required to exercise the same
degree of care as "\vhere the per1nission is authorized actually or ostensibly, he is nevertheless
liable for a wanton, wilful, or reckless injury
inflicted on the third person by a servant who is
acting within the scope of his employment.''
In conclusion, it is submitted that there was more
than adequate evidence to submit the issue of the defendants' willful misconduct, and their liability, to the
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jury, and that the action of the trial court in directing
a verdict in favor of each of the defendants was clearly
error.
Respectfully

~submitted,

SKEEN, THURMAN & WORSLEY,
Attorneys for Appellant
Dated July 26, 1948.
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